深めて！南山GLS　学生の活躍　GLS教員リレーエッセイ

Think about this pair of phrases for a moment.

The baby cried. The mommy picked it up. (Sacks, 1972)

Are the "baby" and "mommy" related? There is nothing in the sentences, no grammar, no vocabulary, that says that they are related. But we hear them as related. Why?

Think of these two words as "categories." When we hear two categories that can fit together somehow said so closely to each other, we naturally assume that they are related to each other. We connect the categories. If you hear the word "mouse" and "rabbit" together, you will probably connect them together as "rodents" or as "cute pets", but if you hear "mouse" and "cockroach" together, you will probably connect them as "things we don't want in our houses."

"Baby" and "mommy" are the same. You probably automatically put them together as "family." This is especially because you expect a "mommy" to take care of their "baby" - there are certain actions, expectations, rights, and obligations that are bound to these categories. If the "mommy" didn't pick up the baby, we would try to make sense of it: maybe the "mommy" isn't the baby's mom after all, or maybe she has a good reason to not pick the baby up, or maybe she's a "bad mommy." Often times, even if it isn't fair, this last point is often how we make sense of that situation.

"Baby" and "mommy" are what we can call Relational Pairs (Sacks, 1972). Let's try to think of a few more. As I give the word, think of what category would go with it.

Parent and ______?

Doctor and ______?

Teacher and ______?

Salesperson and ______?

Friend and ______?

Sibling and ______?

Boyfriend and ______?

Husband and ______?

In order of how they appeared above, you probably thought of categories like "child", "patient", "student", "customer", "friend", and "sibling, brother, or sister." How about for the last two? Did you think "girlfriend" and "wife"? Consider why those would be the first categories that most people think of. Do you notice a possible problem?

The following is a telephone conversation (from Land & Kitzinger, 2005). Janice, a woman, is calling to ask about car insurance. Notice first that Janice refers to her "spouse" in line 1, which does not specify gender or sexuality. Then look at what happens from line 8.

1 Janice: I'm wanting insurance for uhm, two named drivers, self and spouse.

2 Salesman: Yeah, of course.

3 (13 seconds, Salesman typing inputting information)

4 Salesman: Right, I've got you down as a doctor. Do you have the use of any other

5 vehicle within the household?

6 Janice: Yes I do.

7 (0.8, Salesman inputting information)

8 → Salesman: And... you said you'd like to insure your husband to drive the car?

9 → Janice: Uhm... It's not my husband it's my wife and yes I would

10 [like t-

11 Salesman: [Oh I do] beg your pardon.

12 Janice: I would like to insure her.

13 Salesman: Yep, thank you.

14 (11.5, Salesman inputting information)

15 Salesman: 'Kay, could I take your wife's name please?

In lines 1 through 7, Janice and the salesman are doing exactly the things that are expected of a salesman and a customer. The salesman is asking questions and taking note of the information he needs to do his job. Then, in line 8, he asks about Janice's husband. In many ways, this is perfectly "normal". Janice has said she wants to make sure her spouse is insured, which means she is married, and as a woman, could be thought of as a "wife" --- the "normal" categorical partner with "wife" is husband. But as we see here, this is not the case, and Janice corrects him in line 9. Notice that the salesman immediately apologizes in line 11, and after they get back to business, the salesperson uses the category "wife" in line 15.

Land and Kitzinger refer to situations like what happened in line 8 as heteronormativity, treating heterosexuality as the "normal" way to be. In this particular case, the salesman himself treats his assumption as having been rude when he apologizes. This shows a sensitivity to who she is, to her dignity as a human being, and shows her respect. Unfortunately, not everyone is sensitive in this way. Kitzinger (2005) provides this example of two women meeting each other for the first time at lunch during a conference:

01 Ali: How long have you been vegetarian?

02 May: Since I met my partner. She's vegetarian.

03 → Ali: Oh. ((turns to person seated other side of her and does not address

04 May again over the course of nearly 1 hr))

In this case, Ali's response in line 3, saying "Oh" (as if she has learned new information about May, beyond the information she asked for in line 1) and then not talking to May again for the rest of the time they are seated together. In this case, Ali's response reinforces heteronormativity to the extent she treats May's answer in line 2 as problematic.

This kind of thing goes far beyond gender categories. These categories can be about race or ethnicity, or about religious beliefs, age, class, or even what area someone grew up in. How often have you heard people explain someone's personality by talking about whether they are from Kanto or Kansai? Perhaps you can already see here the connection between categories and stereotypes, the assumptions we make about people based on what we see or know about them, often without thinking more deeply.

These categories and stereotypes are a natural part of being human, and are among the building blocks of culture and society. They serve a valuable function for helping us to understand the world around us in a "good enough for right now" way so that we don't have to always question everything around us - after all, if we question absolutely everything, it is very difficult to go about our daily lives. But they also can create situations that keep us from seeing other people's humanity, which unfortunately means we may not recognize the right they have to live a dignified life. In order to support the dignity that everyone deserves, it helps us to sometimes step back and think about the categories we are using, why we are using them, and what those categories say and assume about ourselves and society.

References

Land, V. & Kitzinger, C. (2005). Speaking as a Lesbian: Correcting the Heterosexist Presumption. Research on Language & Social Interaction, 38(4), 371-416. https://doi.org/10.1207/s15327973rlsi3804_1

Kitzinger, C. (2005). Speaking as a Heterosexual: (How) Does Sexuality Matter for Talk-in-Interaction? Research on Language & Social Interaction, 38(3), 221-265. http://dx.doi.org/10.1207/s15327973rlsi3803_2

Sacks, H. (1972). On the analyzability of stories by children. In J.J. Gumperz & D. Hymes (Eds.), Directions in Sociolinguistics: The Ethnography of Communication (pp. 325-345). Rinehart & Winston.